Introduction
Adversarial examples are images with tiny, imperceptible perturbations that fool a classifier into predicting the wrong labels with high confidence. x denotes the input to some classifier, which is a natural example and has label l. A variety of constructions [9, 14, 20, 25] can generate an adversarial example a(x) to make the classifier label it m = l. This is interesting, because || a(x) − x || 2 is so small that we would expect a(x) to be labelled l.
Adversarial examples are a persistent problem of classification neural networks, and of many other classification schemes. Adversarial examples are easy to construct [30, 22, 3] , and there are even universal adversarial perturbations [19] . Adversarial examples are important for practical reasons, because one can construct physical adversarial examples, suggesting that neural networks in current status are unusable in some image classification applications (e.g. imagine a small physical modification that could reliably get a stop sign classified as a go faster sign [25, 16] ). Adversarial examples are important for conceptual reasons Quantized RBF-SVM Detector
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Figure 1: SafetyNet consists of a conventional classifier (in our experiments, either VGG19 or ResNet) with an RBF-SVM that uses discrete codes computed from late stage ReLUs to detect adversarial examples. We show that (a) SafetyNet detects adversarial examples reliably, even if they are produced by methods not represented in the detectors' training set and (b) it is very difficult to produce examples that are both misclassified and slip past SafetyNet's detector.
too, because an explanation of why adversarial examples are easy to construct could cast some light on the inner life of neural networks. The absence of theory means it is hard to defend against adversarial examples (for example, distillation was proposed as a defense [26] , but was later shown to not work [2] ). Adversarial example constructions (e.g., line search along the gradient [9] ; LBFGS on an appropriate cost [30] ; DeepFool [20] ) all rely on the gradient of the network, but it is known that using the gradient of another similar network is sufficient [25] , so concealing the gradient does not work as a defense for current networks. An important puzzle is that networks that generalize very well remain susceptible to adversarial examples [30] . Another important puzzle is that examples that are adversarial for one network tend to be adversarial for another as well [30, 15, 27] . Some network architectures appear to be robust to adversarial examples [13] , which still need more empirical verification. At least some adversarial attacks appear to apply to many distinct networks [19] .
We denote the probability distribution of examples by P (X). At least in the case of vision, P (X) has support on some complicated subset of the input space, which is known as the "manifold" of "real images". Nguyen et al. show how to construct examples that appear to be noise, but are confidently classified as objects [23] . This construction yields a(x) lies outside the support of P (X), so the classifier's labeling is unreliable because it has not seen such examples. However, most adversarial examples "look like" images to humans, such as figure 5 in [30] , so they are likely to lie within the support of P (X).
One way to build a network that is robust to adversarial examples is to train networks with enhanced training data (adding adversarial samples [18] ); this approach faces difficulties, because the dimension of the images and features in networks means an unreasonable quantity of training data is required. Alternatively, we can build a network that detects and rejects an adversarial sample. Metzen et al. show that, by attaching a detection subnetwork that observes the state of the original classification network, one can tell whether it has been presented with an adversarial example or not [17] . However, because the gradients of their detection subnetwork are quite well behaved, the joint system can be attacked (Type II attack) easily in both their and our experiments. Both their and our experiments also show that their detection subnetwork is easily fooled by adversarial samples produced by attacking methods which are not used in detector training process.
Our method focuses on codes produced by quantizing individual ReLUs in particular layers of the classification network ("patterns of activation"), and proceed from the hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Adversarial attacks work by producing different patterns of activation in late stage ReLUs to those produced by natural examples.
These patterns lie outside the family for which the softmax layer would be reliable. This hypothesis suggests that: (a) the presence of an adversarial example can be detected (as in Metzen et al. [17] ); (b) such detectors can be made very difficult to defeat (unlike Metzen et al. [17] ; section 3); (c). such detectors should be good at generalization for different adversarial attacks (unlike Metzen et al. [17] ); (d) transfer attacks work because an example that generates unfamiliar patterns in one network tends to generate unfamiliar patterns in other networks too; (e) transfer attacks could be defended as well (section 3).
Contributions: Section 2 describes our SafetyNet architecture, which consists of the original classifier network and a detector that rejects adversarial examples. A type I attack on SafetyNet consists of a standard adversarial example crafted to be (a) similar to a natural image; (b) misclassified by the original network. A type II attack consists of an example that is crafted to be (a) similar to a natural image; (b) misclassified; and (c) not rejected by SafetyNet.
We show that SafetyNet is robust to both types of attacks and generalize well. Concealing the gradients is highly effective for SafetyNet, and it produces a black box that is strongly resistant to the best attacks we have been able to construct. This is in sharp contrast to all other known methods [25, 17] .
In section 3, we demonstrate SceneProof, a robust and reasonably effective proof that an image is an image of a real scene (a "real" image; contrast a "fake" image, which is not an image of a real scene). We identify images of real scenes by checking a match between the image and a depth map, which is hard to manipulate. We show that SceneProof is (a) accurate and (b) strongly resistant to attacks that try to get manipulated scenes identified as authentic scenes.
In section 4, we propose a model that explains why our approach works, and it also demonstrates that SafetyNet is difficult to attack in principle.
SafetyNet: Spotting Adversarial Examples
SafetyNet consists of the original classifier, and an adversary detector which looks at the internal state of the later layers in the original classifier, as in Figure 1 . If the adversary detector declares that an example is adversarial, then the sample is rejected.
Detecting Adversarial Examples
The adversary detector needs to be hard to attack. We force an attacker to solve a hard discrete optimization problem. For a layer of ReLUs at a high level in the classification network, we quantize each ReLU at some set of thresholds to generate a discrete code (binarized code in the case of one threshold). Our hypothesis 1 suggests that different code patterns appear for natural examples and adversarial examples. We use an adversary detector that compares a code produced at test time with a collection of examples, meaning that an attacker must make the network produce a code that is acceptable to the detector (which is hard; section 3). The adversary detector in SafetyNet uses an RBF-SVM on binary or quaternary codes (activation patterns) to find adversarial examples.
We denote a code by c. The RBF-SVM classifies by
In this objective function, when σ is small, the detector produces essentially no gradient unless the attacking code c is very close to a positive example c i . Our quantization process makes the detector more robust and the gradients even harder to get. Experiments show that this form of gradient obfuscation is quite robust, and that confusing the detector is very difficult without access to the RBF-SVM, and still difficult even when access is possible. Experiments in section 3 and theory in section 4 confirm that the optimization problem is hard.
Attacking Methods
We use the following standard and strong attacks [2] , with various choice of hyper-parameters, to test the robustness of the systems. Each attack searches for a nearby a(x) which changes the class of the example and does not create visual artifacts. We use these methods to produce both type I attack (fool the classifier) and type II attack (fool the classifier and sneak past the detector).
Fast Sign method: Goodfellow et al [9] described this simple method. The applied perturbation is the direction in image space which yields the highest increase of the linearized cost under l ∞ norm. It uses a hyper-parameter to govern the distance between adversarial and original image.
Iterative methods: Kurakin et al. [14] introduced an iteration version of the fast sign method, by applying it several times with a smaller step size α and clipping all pixels after each iteration to ensure that results stay in the neighborhood of the original image. We apply two versions of this method, one where the neighborhood is in L ∞ norm and another where it is in L 2 norm.
DeepFool method: Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [20] introduced the DeepFool adversary, which is able to choose which class an example is switched to. DeepFool iteratively perturbs an image x adv 0 , linearizes the classifier around x adv n and finds the closest class boundary. The minimal step according to the l p distance from x adv n to traverse this class boundary is determined and the resulting point is used as x adv n+1 . The algorithm stops once x adv n+1 changes the class of the actual classifier. We use a powerful L 2 version of DeepFool.
Transfer method: Papernot et al. [25] described a way to attack a black-box network. They generated adversarial samples using another accessible network, which performs the same task, and used these adversarial samples to attack the black-box network. This strategy has been notably reliable.
Type I Attacks Are Detected
Accuracy: Our SafetyNet can detect adversarial samples with high accuracy on CIFAR-10 [12] and ImageNet-1000 [4] . For classification networks, we used a 32-layer ResNet [10] for CIFAR-10 and a VGG19 network [29] for ImageNet-1000. Figures 2 shows the detection accuracy of our Binarized RBF-SVM detector on the x5 layer of ResNet for Cifar10 and on the fc7 layer of VGG19 trained for ImageNet-1000. Adversarial samples are generated by Iterative-L2, Iterative-Linf, DeepFool-L2 and FastSign methods. Figure 2 compares our RBF-SVM detection results with the detector subnetwork results of [17] . The RoC for our detector for Cifar-10 and ImageNet-1000 appears in Figure 3 .
Our results show: When our detector is tested on the same adversary as it is trained on, its performance is similar to the detector subnetwork [17] , even though our detector works on quantized activation patterns while the detector subnetwork works on original continuous activation patterns. DeepFool is a strong attack. Increasing the number of categories in the problem makes it easier for DeepFool to produce an undetected adversarial example, likely because it becomes easier to exploit local classification errors without producing strange ReLU activations. If DeepFool is required to produce a label outside the top-5 for the original example, the attack is much weaker.
Generalization across attacks: Generally, a detector cannot know at training time what attacks will occur at test time. We test generalization across attacks by training a detector on one class of attack, then testing with other classes of attack. Figure 2 shows that our RBF-SVM generalizes across attacks more reliably than a detector subnetwork. We believe this is because the representation presented to the RBF-SVM has been aggressively summarized (by quantization), so that the classifier is not distracted by subtle but irrelevant features. Note this kind of generalization is not guaranteed just by using a neural network; for example, Table 3 shows networks trained on normal quality JPEG images are confounded by low quality JPEG test images.
Our supplementary materials contain dataset description, rejecting by classification confidence, and Type II attack results.
Application: SceneProof
SceneProof is a model application of our SafetyNet, because it would not work with a network that is subject to adversarial examples. We would like Alice to be able to prove to Bob that her photo is real without the intervention of a team of experts, and we'd like Bob to have high confidence in the proof. This proof needs to operate at large scales (i.e. anyone could produce a proof while taking a picture), and automatically.
Current best methods to identify fake images require careful analysis of vanishing points [8] , illumination angles [6] , and shadows [11] (reviews in [8, 7] ). Such analyses are difficult to conduct at large scales or automatically. RGB image editing is easy, with very powerful tools available. We construct a proof by capturing an RGBD image (easily accessible with consumer depth sensors), which changes the security aspect because it's quite hard to edit a depth map convincingly and those edits need to be consistent with the image. The proof of realness is achieved by a classifier that checks both image and depth and determines whether they are consistent. Such a system works if (a) the classifier is acceptably accurate (i.e. it can deter- To facilitate comparison, we follow the conventions of [17] , plotting the success of the adversary (i.e. its ability to fool the classifier; leftward is better) on the horizontal axis and the accuracy of the detector on the vertical axis (higher is better). We show results for binary (SVM) and quaternary (M-SVM) codes, and for a variety of attacks. A: Results for the detection subnetwork on CIFAR-10 from [17] . B: Results for SafetyNet on CIFAR-10, where the detector was trained and tested on adversarial samples generated by the same attacking method (same setting as A). C: Results for SafetyNet and the detection subnetwork (cnn) of [17] on CIFAR-10, where the detector was trained on L ∞ attack and tested on other attacking methods; SafetyNet generalizes better than detection subnetwork to different adversarial attacking methods. D: Results for SafetyNet on ImageNet-1000, where the detector was trained and tested on the same adversarial method. The classifier is evaluated with top-5 accuracy (E is evaluated with top-1 accuracy, note difference in x axis); using top-5 accuracy significantly advantages the adversary detector, because forcing an adversarial example to move out of top-5 requires larger changes. F: Results for SafetyNet on ImageNet-1000 (top-5), where the detector was trained on L ∞ attack and tested on other attacking methods; SafetyNet has relatively small loss of detection accuracy (compared to E). We cannot compare to the detection subnetwork of [17] , because they do not provide results for ImageNet-1000.
CIFAR-10
ImageNet-1000, top-1 ImageNet-1000, top-5 Figure 3 : ROC curve for our adversary detector on various adversaries. Left: CIFAR-10; center: ImageNet-1000, top-1; right: ImageNet-1000, top-5. Deepfool-5 is a variant of deepfool that is required to force the adversarial example out of the original example's top 5 classes. Deepfool is a strong adversarial attack, and seems to benefit from being able to choose the target class from multiple classes. Figure 4 : We show figures for successful Type I attacks (fool the classifier) on the original classifier network, and successful Type II attacks (fool both the classifier and detector) on our SafetyNet. Attackers are only allowed to manipulate the depth. Our SafetyNet is very difficult to attack and attacks changing label from False to True is harder. Successful attacks on our SafetyNet requires the original inputs hard to classify and the attacks also need to manipulate the images more.
mine whether the pair is real or not accurately); (b) it can detect a variety of adversarial manipulations of depth or image or both (i.e. type I attacks fail) ; and (c) type II attacks generally fail. We achieve this by using the SafetyNet architecture.
We are mainly concerned with attacks label "fake" images "real". Natural attacks on our system are: produce a depth map for an RGB image using some regression method to obtain an RGBD image (regression); manipulate RGBD image by inserting new objects; take an RGBD image labeled "fake" and manipulate it to be labeled "real" (type I adversarial); take an RGBD image labeled "fake" and manipulate it to be labeled "real" in a way that fools SafetyNet's adversary detector (type II adversarial). There is a wide range of available regression/adversarial attacks, and our system needs to be robust to various methods which might be used to prepare the regression/adversarial attack.
Real test data is easily obtained. We use the raw Kinect captures of LivingRoom and Bedroom from NYU v2 dataset [21] . However, fake data requires care. To evaluate generalization over different attacks, we omit some "regression" methods from the training data and use them only in test. "Regression" methods used in both train and test are: random swaps of depth and image planes; single image predicted depth [5] ; rectangle cropped region insertion and random shifted or scaled misaligned depth and image. "Regression" methods used only in test are: all zero depth values; nearest neighbor down-sample and up-sampled images and depths; low quality JPEG compressed images and depths; Middlebury stereo RGBD dataset [28] and Sintel RGBD dataset [1] (which should be classified "fake" because they are renderings). Refer to Figure 4 for dataset and attacks.
Type I attacks on SafetyNet fail: Type I attacks on SceneProof using a familiar adversary (i.e. one used to train the detector) fail. We report results for two detectors A (applied to fc7 of VGG19) and B (applied to fc6 of VGG19) in Table 2 . Type I attacks on SceneProof using an unfamiliar adversary (i.e. one not used to train the detector) generally fail. We report results for two detectors A (applied to fc7 of VGG19) and B (applied to fc6 of VGG19) in Table 3 .
A type II attack must both fool the classifier and sneak past the detector. We distinguish between two conditions. In non-blackbox case, the internals of the SafetyNet system is accessible to the attacker. Alternatively, the network may be a black box, with internal states and gradients concealed. In this case, attackers must probe with inputs and gather outputs, or build another approximate network as in [25] .
Type II attacks on accessible SafetyNet fail: a type Table 2 . Type I attacks on SceneProof using an unfamiliar adversary (i.e. one not used to train the detector) generally fail. All these examples should be labelled false, OR rejected as adversarial. The column for each detector reports the rate at which the detector identifies examples as adversarial. For example, in the first row, 76.5% of zero D channel RGBD images are correctly labelled as false by the classifier; of those labelled "true", 82.0% are rejected as adversarial (last column). This means that a total of 4.2% of zero D channel RGBD images pass through SafetyNet with "true" labels.
II attack involves a search for an adversarial example that will be (a) mislabelled and (b) not detected. This search is made difficult by the quantization procedure and by the narrow basis functions in the RBF-SVM, so we smooth the quantization operation and the RBF-SVM kernel operation. Smoothing is essential to make the search tractable, but can significantly misapproximate SafetyNet (which is what makes attacks hard). Our smoothing attack uses a sigmoid function with parameter λ to simulate the quantization process. We also help the search process by increasing the size of the RBF parameter σ to form smoother gradients. Even after smoothing the objective function, attacks tend to fail, likely because it is hard to make an effective tradeoff between easy search and approximation. Table 4 includes Type I and Type II, blackbox and non-blackbox attacking results on SceneProof dataset. Our SafetyNet is the most robust architecture to various attacks.
Type II attacks on black box SafetyNet fail: Assume the state of SafetyNet is concealed. We follow [24, 19] by building attacks on various alternative networks, then transferring these network's adversarial samples. These attacks fail for our SafetyNet, refer to Table 4 . In contrast to SafetyNet, the detector subnetwork of [17] is generally susceptible to type II attacks in both blackbox and non-blackbox settings. This is because of quantization process and detection subnetwork's classification boundary problem [19].
Theory: Bars and P-domains
We construct one possible explanation for adversarial examples that successfully explains (a) the phenomenology and (b) why SafetyNet works. In this explanation, we assume the network uses ReLU and weight decay, because they are representative, make it easier to explain, and likely to extend to other conditions with some modifications. We have a network with N layers of ReLU's, and study y
, the values at the output of the k'th layer of ReLUs. This is a piecewise linear function of x. Such functions break up the input space into cells, at whose boundaries the piecewise linear function changes (i.e. is only C 0 ). Now assume that for some y We will always use the term "p-domain" to refer to domains with these properties. We think that the total measure of all p-domains under P (X) is small. By construction, ReLU networks can represent such pdomains. We construct a p-domain using a basis function with small support. R(u) denote a ReLU applied to u. We have basic bar function φ.
where φ has support when | x i − s | < and has peak value We expect such p-domains to have several important properties. Adversarial fertility: P-domains can be used to make adversarial examples by choosing a point in a pdomain close to x. Because there are no or few examples in the p-domain, the loss may not cause the classifier to control the maximum value attained by y (k) i (x) in this p-domain; and the large range of values inside the p-domain can be used to change the values in layers upstream of k, by moving the example around the p-domain. Generalization-neutral: The requirement that p-domains have small measure in P (X) means that both train and test examples are highly unlikely to lie in p-domains. A system with p-domains could generalize well without being immune to adversarial examples. Some subset of pdomains are likely findable by LBFGS. Consider the gradient of y (N ) i (x) with respect to x in two cells separated by a boundary, where some ReLU changes state, weight decay encourages a relatively small change in gradient over these boundaries. If cells neighboring a p-domain have no or few examples in them, we can expect that the gradient change within cell is small too and a second order approximation of y (N ) i (x) could be reliable. We also expect cells to be small, so search and entering a p-domain are possible and requires crossing multiple cell boundaries, which means many changes in ReLU activation. This argument suggests p-domains present odd patterns of ReLU activation, particularly in p-domains where some of the y Why p-domains could exist: As Zhang et al. point out, the number of training examples available to a typical modern network is small compared to the relative capacity of deep networks [31] . For example, excellent training error is obtainable for randomly chosen image labels [31] . We expect that y (N ) i (x) will have a number of cells that is exponential in the dimension of x, ensuring that the vast majority of cells lack any example. However, the weight decay term is not sufficient to ensure that y could be large, which is a result of multiple layer norms interacting poorly.
An alternative to attacking by search using smoothed RBF gradients is as follows. One might pass an example through the main classifier, determine what code it had, then seek an adversarial example that produces that code (and so must fool the RBF-SVM). We sketch a proof that the optimization problem is extremely difficult. Choose some threshold t > 0. We use b t (u) for the function that binarizes its argument with t. Assume we have at least one unit y (k) i that encodes a weighted sum of bar functions. We wish to create an adversarial example a(x * ) that (a) meets criteria for being adversarial and (b) ensures that b t (y (k) i (a)) takes a prescribed value (either one or zero). The feasible set for this constraint can be disconnected (e.g. a sum of the bump functions of Figure 5 (right)), and so need not be convex, implying that the optimization problem is intractable. As a simple example, the following constraint set is disconnected for < 1/2 {x | b t (b(x; 1, 0, ) + b(x; 1, 1, ) ) = 1} .
Discussion
We have described a method to produce a classifier that identifies and rejects adversarial examples. Our SafetyNet is able to reject adversarial examples that come from attacking methods not seen in training data. We have shown that it is hard to produce an example that (a) is mislabeled and (b) is not detected as adversarial by SafetyNet. We have sketched one possible reason that SafetyNet works, and is hard to attack. Many interesting problems are opened by our work, and we provides lots of insights into the mechanism that neural network works.
SaferNet: There might be some better architecture than our SafetyNet, whose objective function is harder to optimize. The ideal case would be an architecture that forces the attacker to solve a hard discrete optimization problem which does not naturally admit smoothing.
Neural network pruning: Our work suggests that networks behave poorly for input space regions where no data has been seen. We speculate that this behavior could be discouraged by a post-training pruning process, which removes neurons, paths or activation patterns not touched by training data.
Explicit management of overshoot during training: we have explained adversarial examples using p-domains, which is the result of poor damping of weights during training. We speculate that constructing adversarial examples during training, by identifying locations where this damping problem occurs and exploiting structural insights into network behavior, could control the adversarial sample problem (rather than just using adversarial examples as training data).
